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Ab s tract 
The dual-economy model predicts that holding productivity constant, labor reallocation from less 
to more productive sectors, also known as 'structural change ' results in improvement in economy­
wide productivity. The objective of this thesis is to test the empirical predictions of this model 
using sectoral-level data from twenty-eight developing countries. Using the shift-share growth 
decomposition approach, we find regional growth-enhancing effects of structural change in Asia, 
Latin America and North Africa from, 1980 to 2000 and growth-reducing effects in Sub-Saharan 
Africa over the same period. However, as intersectoral productivity gaps disappeared after 2000, 
technological progress led the growth process in much of Asia and North Africa, while Sub­
Saharan Africa and Latin America benefited immensely from structural change over the same 
period. At the country level, however, structural change has been growth-reducing in many 
countries as labor moved in the wrong direction. 
We then proceeded to investigate the determinants of the contribution of structural change 
to the growth process at the country level. Contrary to the literature, we find evidence that rigidity 
in the labor market enhances the contribution of structural change to growth as it slows the wrong 
labor reallocation process. Beginning the estimation period with high agricultural employment 
shares as well as investment are also found to have significant and positive impact on the structural 
change contribution to growth. This study provides useful insight into the experiences of 
developing countries. The lesson learnt is simple; productivity-returns to structural change is not 
a default outcome of just any labor reallocation process. For countries to benefit from labor 
reallocation, the market must be conditioned to direct labor from less productive to more 
productive sectors. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent emergence of data on value-added and sectoral employment shares in developing 
countries has reignited the interest of researchers in economic growth induced by shifts in 
employment shares across sectors. We shall refer to this shifts in employment shares as structural 
change. Long before the availability of sectoral-level data, the extant literature had noted structural 
change as an indispensable component of the growth process ( Lewis, 1954 ). Even when aggregate 
growth appears homogeneous, intersectoral productivity levels may be heterogeneous. 
Specifically, as some sectors shrink, other grow. The literature documents two main sources of 
growth. First, differences in intersectoral technology triggers variations in sectoral productivity 
and wages. The productivity and wage differentials then induce reallocation of labor and capital 
to more productive sectors, i.e. structural change (Marconi & de Andrade Aragao, 2016; Syrquin, 
1988). While all economies experience structural change, the pace and direction of change is what 
distinguishes developed countries from underdeveloped ones. Generally, overall productivity only 
grows when labor moves from less productive to more productive sectors. Baumol ( 1967) refers 
to this as structural bonus. However, if labor moves from more productive sectors to less 
productive sectors, then structural change will be negatively correlated with overall productivity 
resulting in a structural burden- the converse of structural bonus (Fagerberg, 2000; Hsieh & 
Kienow, 2009; Maddison, 1987; McMillan, Rodrik, & Verduzco-Gallo, 2014; Timmer & de Vries, 
2009). 
In this essay, we examine the effects of structural change on labor productivity in a select 
number of developing countries. Specifically, we ask, to what extent does overall labor 
productivity growth depend on intersectoral labor reallocation or structural change? More 
1 
precisely, in the case of developing countries, has structural change been productivity-enhancing 
or productivity-diminishing? What is the exact magnitude of this change? Additionally, what 
factors underlie the magnitude of growth induced by structural change in these regions? Also, how 
does the structural change 'experiences' differ by region? We examine these questions for twenty­
eight developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North 
African regions. 
For developing countries the theoretical literature often models structural bonus as a 
function of the rate of deagriculturalization- the movement of labor from agriculture into 
manufacturing or other Lewis-type modem sectors (Jorgenson & Timmer, 2011; Maddison, 1987). 
This is because large intersectoral productivity gaps exist in developing countries, particularly, 
between agriculture and other sectors (Gollin, Lagakos, & Waugh, 2014b). The gaps reflect not 
only the stark variations in production functions across sectors, investment opportunities and 
capital accumulation but also, rigidity in resource reallocation- particularly labor, which tend to 
decelerate overall productivity growth( Gollin, Lagakos, & Waugh, 2014a; McMillan et al. , 2014). 
For a country to reverse this trend and set itself on the path to growth, intersectoral labor shares 
must adjust to commensurate with their relative contribution to overall productivity. Thus, the 
literature argues that the starting point for any meaningful inquiry into the development 
experiences of different countries must be an analysis of structural change dynamics (Lin & 
Monga, 2011). To be precise, what has been the direction of intersectoral labor reallocation within 
the economy and how has this contributed to productivity growth? Accordingly, these questions 
have begun to receive attention in the developing world, particularly, following the rise of the 
Asian Tigers and the Chinese success story. However, studies of this nature are limited by 
availability of data on employment shares and productivity in developing countries. It is therefore 
2 
unsurprising that the recent availability of data has led to a renewed interest in the study of the 
empirics of structural change in developing countries. Yet, the frontiers are fresh as very few 
studies have done a detailed examination of structural change in developing countries. 
McMillan et al. (2014) for example studied the effects of structural change on overall 
productivity growth in a cocktail of low, middle and high-income countries from Africa, Latin and 
North America, Europe and Asia. They found a growth-reducing effect of structural change in both 
Africa and Latin America even though structural change seemed to have positive effects on 
Africa's growth after 2000. Their study which covered the period 1990 to 2005 is limited by data 
unavailability for the pre-1990s and post 2000's. De Vries et al. (2015) extend this dataset by 
studying the implications of structural transformation in Africa and its implications for 
productivity growth from 1960 to 2010 with a self-constructed dataset. They also found Africa's 
long-run development pattern to be comparable to that of Latin America, but different from Asia's. 
However, the authors do not seek an enquiry into the determinants of structural change over these 
extended periods. Thus, leaving a gap in the literature that our paper will seek to fill. 
This essay extends the work of De Vries et al. (20 15) by focusing on an extended dataset 
for thirty-one developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East 
and North African regions. Additionally, we conduct counterfactual exercises to obtain 
hypothetical productivity growth estimates given an 'optimal rate ' of deagriculturalization. 
Together with the questions outlined earlier, we examine these issues for two different time periods 
with data from the De Vries et al. (2015) 10-Sector database and the World Bank's World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database using an augmented version of Fabricant ( 1942)'s shift­
share decomposition method. Our paper is significantly different from the extant literature in 
diverse ways. First, following the argument by Pritchett (2000) that studies of growth patterns are 
3 
often meaningful over short and separate periods of time, we break our data into two different time 
periods. Our first period; from 1980 to 2000 is intended to capture the effects of several significant 
global events. First, for Latin America this represents the Latin American debt crises that led to 
the 1980s being dubbed as the region's lost decade. For Sub-Saharan Africa, this marked the 
beginning of large structural adjustment programs with neo-liberal market reforms targeted at 
financial, capital, and labor market deregulation, removal of trade protection which affected firm 
performance and labor reallocation. For our Asian sample, it was equally a period of major 
macroeconomic reforms. The Indian liberalization reforms of 1991, and the Chinese reforms of 
the 1980s are prominent examples. Many of the events that make this period stand out are detailed 
in our discussion of findings. The sustained growth that reforms brought about in Asia, post-2000, 
led to a surge in world commodity demand, pushing up commodity prices and helping many 
commodity exporting economies of Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa to accumulate much 
needed foreign exchange to maintain macroeconomic stability and support their growth efforts. 
The post-2000 was also associated with increased globalization which helped many firms in 
developing countries to learn best practices and new technologies needed to improve productivity. 
Thus, we choose 2001 to 2010 as our second period. 
The remainder of the paper is grouped as follows: Chapter 2 provides a detailed review of 
the relevant literature and some stylized facts. Chapter 3 covers the data and methodology adopted 
for this study. In Chapter 4 we present our results and discuss the findings while Chapter 5 
concludes the study and provides policy recommendations based on the study. 
4 
Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Structural Chang e and Productivity Growth 
The relationship between structural change and economic growth is hardly direct. This is because 
structural change could either be an output or an input in the growth process. First, overall 
productivity growth and therefore economic growth is associated with correlative changes in 
sectoral shares of output, employment, nature of production functions and the configuration of 
economic institutions which creates a feedback loop in the growth process. That notwithstanding, 
earlier work in development economics attempted to establish some stylized facts by observing 
the paths that countries followed to development. However, these attempts were constrained by 
data unavailability on sectoral employment shares in developing countries as noted earlier. 
Different reasons account for this; the low capacity (funding and skilled personnel) of national 
statistical bodies to collect accurate data, political sensitivity of data published and the large size 
of the informal sector among others. Thus, earlier research work in this area tended to give 
descriptive overviews of observed trends and patterns of the development process in different 
countries. Recently however, availability of data has rekindled the interest of economists who are 
increasingly applying these earlier models to the data. This section gives an overview of some 
theories of structural change, the stylized facts in the literature and some recent empirical findings. 
2.2 The Dual-E conomy Model 
While there is no disagreement in the literature that productivity refers to the ratio of output to 
input used, there exists no consensus on the measure of productivity. For some, while the main 
objective of measuring productivity is to trace technical change (Guellec & de la Potterie, 2001), 
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others regard productivity as a means of measuring efficiency of inputs (Diewert & Lawrence, 
1999). Whatever the objective of productivity measurement is, productivity increases are 
associated with higher output, all things equal. However, productivity levels are not homogenous 
across sectors within the same economy or even firms within the same sector. Out of this 
heterogeneity emerges one of the fundamental theories of growth; structural change- whose 
underlying assumption is that variations in intersectoral productivity levels create a signal that 
directs efficient resource allocation within the economy (Isaksson, 2010). The foundation for this 
'structuralist' thinking was laid by Lewis (1954) who assumed a dual-economy model 
characterized by productivity differentials between the agricultural (traditional) sector and the 
manufacturing (modem) sector. Workers in the agricultural sector which is characterized by 
surplus labor, earn the average value of labor since the 'real' marginal product of labor in 
agriculture, MP La , approaches zero. Assuming wages in the manufacturing sector remain 
constant, the persistent low agricultural productivity which determines the minimum wage, (w), 
will create a positive wage differential, ro which acts as an incentive in reallocating labor from 
agriculture to the manufacturing. With manufacturing experiencing, high productivity, additional 
employment enhances overall productivity while simultaneously improving productivity in the 
agriculture as average product of labor increases with a declining labor share since: 
iJ(TP) = f'(TP) = lim MPL f' > 0 
iJl �l--+O 
a• 
Where TP is total productivity and f' is the first derivative with respect to labor. This process of 
labor reallocation continues until w = 0. 
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2.3 Criticis ms of the Model 
The source of the wage differential is not specified within the model. That is, whether it 
through capital accumulation or just technological progress. Another major criticism of the model 
is the assumption of perfect labor mobility and an almost instantaneous elimination of the wage 
differential that sets w = 0 .  The model of Harris and Todaro ( 1970) points to a major flaw in this 
assumption. Specifically, it argues that while reallocation of labor to the modem sector is a 
necessary condition in finding a high-wage job, it is not sufficient. Faced by the risk of 
unemployment, workers tend to supply labor at rates that widens the agricultural-manufacturing 
wage differential. Krugman (1994) in his analysis of Hirschman ( 1958)'s "Strategy of Economic 
Development" also criticized Lewis for emphasizing dualism while ignoring the role of economies 
of scale and circular causation. That is, the greater tendency for intersectoral forward and backward 
linkages, facilitated by the presence of intermediate goods, to enhance overall productivity growth. 
This kind of growth, Fleming (1955) argues, can be self-reinforcing without the need for a strict 
dualism. On the other hand, this circular causation could be growth-reducing. Precisely, the lack 
of structural change and productivity growth can also provide positive feedback to each other, 
starting and sustaining a vicious poverty cycle. Krugman also finds Lewis' empirical basis for 
assuming surplus labor to be weak. Even when labor surplus exists, recent works have shown that 
not everyone migrates. For example, Matsuyama (1992) notes that only the young have an 
incentive to relocate while Banerjee and Newman (1998) demonstrate how credit constraints can 
restrain intersectoral labor reallocation. 
As we will show in our analysis, even though many of the countries in our sample exhibit 
large intersectoral productivity gaps and presumably wide wage differentials, labor reallocation 
has been a very slow process. In Africa, for example, even when less productive sectors have 
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released some labor; they end up in similarly less productive sectors- making it difficult for the 
region to realize the full benefits of labor reallocation. However, it is also worth noting that 
countries differ in how long it takes for more productive sectors to absorb excess labor from less 
productive sectors. This as well is a function of many variables; from institutionalized labor market 
rigidity to the natural inability of highly capital-intensive industries to employ labor beyond a 
certain threshold. However, as Magacho (2016) observes, for Lewis ( 1954), excess labor is not 
peculiar to agrarian economies where employment share of agriculture is very high but to all 
economies where some form of labor underutilization exists. Specifically, if wages paid to labor 
in a sector is less than the marginal product of labor in any sector i , i .e. w < MP Li , then it must 
be that labor supply exceeds demand at any given price. 
The model has also been criticized for ignoring the possibility of firms investing in labor­
saving technology, ability of labor unions to negotiate for upward wage revisions etc. Empirically, 
however, these ideas are often difficult to test in the face of data constraints. Others have argued 
that the sharp distinction between agriculture and manufacturing limits the real-world relevance of 
the model in view of today's increasingly complex economy. However, Timmer and de Vries 
(2009) argue that the dual-economy model was not based on a sharp distinction between 
agriculture and industry but rather, on the differences between traditional and modem activities 
which coexist even within individual sectors of the economy. For instance, export-oriented 
agriculture may exhibit productivity levels that are higher than productivity levels in small-scale 
subsistence farms or petty trade in agricultural products and services. 
2.4 Other Models 
Subsequent works include Chenery (1960) who argued on the contrary that, while growth 
in overall productivity is often accompanied by a rise in the share of the manufacturing output, 
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this doesn't hold for all countries. In fact, he argues, growth patterns vary with countries as natural 
resource endowments that are key to the growth process are heterogeneous across countries. Thus, 
an economy with comparative advantage in agricultural production could grow without increasing 
its share of manufacturing production by importing relatively cheaper manufactured goods to 
offset the shortage created by the smaller domestic supply capacity. 
Regardless of the criticisms of the dual-economy model, the literature is in consensus that 
this model provided the foremost theoretical foundation for subsequent works on structural change. 
It shows that if there exist productivity gaps and excess labor supply, there is a possibility for 
structural change- an important source of improvements in overall productivity. In this paper, we 
exploit some estimation strategies in the literature to test the implications of a multiple-sector 
version of the model. Before proceeding, we will give a brief overview of the extant empirical 
work on productivity growth accounting. 
2.5 E mpirical L iterature 
Empirical studies into productivity growth accounting in developing countries is only a 
recent phenomenon. Studies into productivity growth is gathering momentum and this section will 
attempt to give a brief summary of the available empirical findings. Timmer and de Vries (2009) 
studied the contributions of structural change in 19 countries from Asia and Latin America with a 
dataset that spanned 1950-2005. Using a modified shift-share decomposition method, they found 
that growth accelerations in Asia and Latin America are explained by s productivity improvements 
and not by reallocation of labor to more productive sectors. McMillan et al. (2014) followed this 
up with a study of thirty-eight countries that included twenty-four developing countries from Asia, 
Africa and Latin-America. They found that in both Africa and Latin America, labor reallocation 
has rather contributed negatively toward overall productivity. The authors note, however, that 
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beyond the year 2000, labor reallocation began to contribute positively to overall productivity in 
Africa. De Vries et al. (2015) then extended the study of McMillan et al. (2014) by widening the 
coverage of countries and the number of years specifically, for Africa. The authors concluded that 
in Africa, workers who left agriculture during the immediate post-independence years of the 
1960's found gainful employment in manufacturing causing growth accelerations as overall 
productivity increased. However, the oil price shocks of the 1970's and its attendant currency 
instability severely limited the ability of manufacturing firms to hire and thus efficient labor 
reallocation stalled, stagnating economic growth. Havlik, Leitner, and Stehrer (2012) found the 
speed and size of structural change in Central and Eastern Europe (Non-EU members) to be higher 
than member countries of the European Union under study. In Tunisia, where productivity growth 
has seen a relatively sustained pace, structural change- at best has played a limited role (Marouani 
& Mouelhi, 2015). Jain (2016) studied the link between structural transformation and growth in 
India and finds a link between pre-mature transition of the Indian economy into services and 
economic growth. On his part, Mallick (2015) examined structural change and its effect on 
productivity growth in Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa but found significant positive 
impacts only in China and India. 
Our essay adds to the literature in significantly diverse ways. First, our study deviates from 
the existing literature by focusing strictly on developing countries. Second, we cover two North 
African countries for the first time in the literature. Additionally, we conduct two different 
counterfactual experiments for Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, to estimate what a 
hypothetical growth in productivity would be if labor reallocation followed the patterns in ( 1) Asia 
as a region and (2) in China. Furthermore, we empirically examine the drivers of the magnitude of 
structural change across our sample. 
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CHAPTER3 
Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data Sources 
Our paper uses two main sources of data; the Groningen Growth and Development Center ( GGDC) 
10-sector database and the World Bank's WDI database. The analysis of data is split into two 
sections. Section 1 uses value added and employment shares data from the GGDC database to 
conduct the productivity-growth decompositions. In Section 2, we apply panel regression analysis 
to the data from the WDI database to estimate the determinants of the computed structural change 
component of productivity growth. Specifically, we extract data on 28 developing countries from 
Asia, Latin America (LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and the Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) region. Our Asian sample consists of China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Thailand while our MENA sample is made up of Morocco and Egypt. In Latin America, we cover 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela while our Sub-Saharan 
sample include Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Tanzania, South Africa and Zambia. The data covers the ten major sectors (unless otherwise stated) 
comprising the whole economy as defined by the International Standard Industrial Classification, 
Revision 3. 1 (ISIC rev. 3. 1). The countries, description of the sectors and data span covered in this 
study are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 of the appendix 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
This thesis revolves around testing the implications of an extended version of the Lewis ( 1954) 
dual-economy model. Following Matsuyama ( 1992) and Murphy et al. ( 1989), we provide a formal 
representation of the model as follows: 
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Assume a dual-economy model with a manufacturing sector ( M) and agricultural sector (A). Let, 
M and A be Lewis' modem and agricultural sectors respectively. In this model, the size of the 
population, P equals labor supply, L, which is constant. Thus, P = L = 1 . The production 
functions are given by 
(1) 
(2) 
Where Yr and ytA are the outputs of the sectors Mand A respectively. lt is the manufacturing 
share of employment such that lt + (1 - lt) = 1. A0 is productivity in agriculture and Mt is 
productivity in manufacturing reflecting knowledge accumulation Both sectors experience 
diminishing returns where f' and f are the second differentials of output with respect to sectoral 
shares in employment. A0 is time-invariant and is assumed to be exogenous to the model as it 
reflects the level of technology and natural environmental endowments such as land quality, 
climate and perhaps absence of pests. However, Mt-i is assumed to be pre-determined but firms 
take this as given in making output and input decisions. Over time, manufacturing firms learn new 
practices through experience and thus accumulate some form of knowledge capital which is 
assumed not to depreciate. This knowledge is given by 
dM_ • _ M - - Mt - cp Yt ............. (3) dt 
Competition in a finite labor market yields the following equilibrium: 
The variable p is the price of the manufacturing good in terms of the agricultural commodity . 
Consumers in this economy are assumed to have Stone-Geary utility-driven preferences, where 
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o,A,p > 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (5) 
cm, C A in equation ( 5) represents the consumption of manufacturing and consumption goods 
respectively, Bis the utility discount rate and the parameter A and represents the minimum level 
of food consumed that makes the inequality in (6) hold. 
Ag(1 - lt) > AL> 0 . . . . . . . .  . (6) 
It follows from this inequality that the productive capacity of the agricultural sector is enough to 
supply food that consumers can purchase with the minimum wage. Since A is positive, it means 
consumers have non-homothetic preferences and that income elasticity of demand for food< 1 1  1-
Therefore, additional increases in income result in less than proportionate expenditure on food, the 
rest of which is spent on manufactured products. This is obvious from Engel ( 1857) law. 
Consumers are also assumed to have enough income to effectively demand more than A units of 
food. This assumption is crucial in making the Engel's law hold in our model. Thus, it follows 
from equation ( 5) that the aggregate demand for the two goods satisfies 
ct= AL + optCf, ......................... . (7) 
A further assumption of a closed system is made such that 
Cf= ytM = Mtf(lt) · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·  (8) 
ct = ytA = Atg(1 - lt) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . (9) 
L 
Combining these with equations (3) and (6) yields 0Clt) =AA, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ( 10) 
Where 0Clt) = g(1 - lt) - 8f'(1 - lt) ;,��) which satisfies 0(0)= g(l), 0(1) < 0, and 0'< 0. 
3 a unique solution, lt = v(A) with v'(A) > 0 in (0, 1) from equation (6) and (10) . 
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It thus follows from this that 1 - lt is constant over time and that correlation(A, 1 - lt) > 0.  
Manufacturing grows at  a constant rate and is also positively related to agricultural output. Finally, 
aggregate food consumption, also growing at a constant rate can be expressed by 
(CA= yA) = Ag(l - v(A) =AL + A8g'(l - v(A)) :,%��;)" ......... . ( 11) 
The prediction that results from this model is that an increase in non-food expenditure causes 
manufacturing to grow. With employment in manufacturing unchanged, manufacturing 
productivity increases, which in turn widens the wage differential. This then acts as an incentive 
for labor reallocation from agriculture to manufacturing as required (Matsuyama, 1992; Murphy 
et al. ,  1989) . This theory provides the basis for the empirical exercises conducted in this essay. 
However, we assume a multiple-sector economy to accommodate the complexities of today's 
world. 
3.3 Computing Productivity 
We compute the sectoral productivity using annual time series data on value-added and 
employment shares in each sector. Gross value added in sector i at time t, Yit• is measured as 
the output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. However, 
depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources are not netted 
out of the gross value added. Share of employment in sector i at time t, lit is computed as 'all 
persons employed'. This includes all paid employees, self-employed and family workers. It is 
worth noting that the labor here is measured as persons employed rather than number of hours 
worked. Thus, there is a possibility that variations in the number of hours worked which may feed 
output positively or negatively assuming diminishing returns to labor input, will be obscured under 
such crude aggregations. 
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Beyond the difficulties in obtaining data on hours worked, not all developing countries 
possess accurate and consistent data on employment shares particularly at the sectoral level. Thus, 
the data on sectoral employment shares used in this paper are computed based on labor force 
surveys conducted at both the household and firm level. These surveys provide information on 
self-employed persons as well as family labor which though imperfect, gives a more accurate 
representation of employment shares than standard national reports may show. To obtain figures 
that are closer to reality, data from national population censuses are used to establish start and end-
period employment shares, since they are periodical- typically, once every ten years, while the 
labor force surveys are used to establish the trends in between. Gross value-added data are not free 
from errors either. The dynamic nature of the economy means that growth-accounting procedures 
are periodically revised by national statistical offices to accommodate new sectors and economic 
activities. National account series Gross Domestic Product (GDP) may also be rebased which 
affects the derivation of the value-added data. To ensure consistency, de Vries et al. (2014) used 
the GDP levels for the most recent base year, expressed in that year's prices, from the national 
accounts they then link other historical national accounts series to the base year in order to maintain 
the growth rates of the individual series (de Vries et al. ,  2014) . Thus, all gross value-added data 
are measured in 2005 constant dollars. Productivity for each sector at time t, is computed as the 
value added in 2005 constant dollars per worker. Mathematically, productivity, y in sector 
i at time t is given by 
(12) 
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Overall productivity is then computed as a weighted aggregate of the productivity levels for all 
sectors at a time. Mathematically, overall productivity in each year, Yt , is given by: 
n 
Yt = I lit * Dit ... ... ... ... (13) 
i,t=1 
Where the weight, Dit is employment share of sector i at time t. 
3.4 Meas uring Inters ectoral Productivity Gaps 
The notion that structural change could be a source of growth dwells significantly on the 
assumption that developing countries tend to exhibit large intersectoral productivity gaps. To test 
this assumption as the basis of our productivity-growth decomposition, we compute intersectoral 
productivity gaps by following the approach of McMillan et al. (2014) to measure the dispersion 
of sectoral productivity levels around the mean of overall productivity . Mathematically, 
intersectoral productivity gap, <p2001, is given by 
ai2001 
'P2001 = ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (14) LOBYi2001 
where a is the standard deviation in log of sectoral productivity for country i in 2001 and log y 
the mean of the log of overall productivity in 200 1 for country i. The log transformations are 
intended to normalize the distribution. Therefore, while the minimum and maximum productivity 
levels give a rough idea of the what the possible variations in productivity could be for a country, 
cp gives us a more specific measure of the extent of variation in productivity levels in 2001. A 
detailed discussion of intersectoral productivity gaps is presented in Chapter 4 The choice of 2001 
as reference point is to allow us to connect productivity gaps to our second period analysis. Table 
3 in the appendix provides the summary statistics for the data used in section 1 of our analysis. It 
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must be noted that the minimum and maximum productivity levels refer to the lowest and highest 
productivity levels for any given sector in a country. 
As the summary statistics show, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America exhibit similar 
characteristics over the period of study in terms of the sectors with the lowest and highest 
productivity levels. In 9 out of the 11  countries in our Sub-Saharan African sample, agriculture 
posted the lowest productivity level for any given year while mining, utilities services and financial 
services had the highest productivity levels. In Asia, however, the lowest productivity levels for 
any given year were seen in mainly agriculture and government services. 
3.5 Decompos ing Productivity Growth 
There are diverse ways of looking at economic growth. First, growth can be thought of in 
terms of a shift of the production possibility curve usually due to discovery of new resources, an 
increase in capital and labor, or advancement in technology. Typically, in decomposing this type 
of growth, a distinction is made between growth resulting from technological advancement and 
that resulting from changes in allocative efficiency. That is, to split it between growth resulting 
from factor accumulation and an unexplained component which can be called total factor 
productivity. Decomposition can then be made into contributions to economic growth and growth 
resulting from reallocation of resources among sectors in the economy. This paper adopts the 
latter; we decompose the sources of productivity growth into (1) intrasectoral productivity growth 
and (2) intersectoral reallocation of labor. 
Intrasectoral productivity increases occur as firms within the industry adopt new practices, 
realign their plants, and alter their production functions to adopt technologies. These cause the 
value added per worker in the firm to rise without a change in labor employment. We shall attribute 
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the intrasectoral productivity increases to technological progress and for simplicity refer to it as 
the 'technological progress effect' in the remainder of the paper. Overall productivity increases 
may also occur as a prediction of the two-sector model where reallocation of excess labor from 
less productive sectors to more productive sectors causes productivity levels to increase in both 
sectors, assuming the presence of economies of scale. As noted earlier, the reverse also holds. In 
the literature, several methods exist for carrying out productivity-growth decomposition. In the 
following subsection, we will briefly review the most commonly used shift-share decomposition 
methods. 
3.6 Decompos ing Structural Chang e 
In the literature, the structural change effect is sometimes split further into a static and a dynamic 
component. This is the approach of Fagerberg (2000) who uses equation (15) to do this kind of 
decomposition. 
"
Y 
= Yt - Yo = Lf=1Yw(8u - Oio) + Lf=1 owCYit - Yio) + Lf=1CYit - Yio)(Oit - Oio) (15) 
L.l Yo Lf=1Yio 
..... . 
Where Y is aggregate productivity growth derived from equation (13), Yt is aggregate productivity 
in the end-period, t, and Y0 is aggregate productivity in the base year, o. On the other hand, Yw 
is productivity of sector i in the base year while Yit is the productivity of sector i in the end-period. 
Employment share of sector i in the base year is given by 8w while the end-period employment 
share of sector i is given by 8it 
Accordingly, the first term on the right-hand side is the aggregate of the change in end-
period, t from the base year, o, productivity levels weighted by the base-year's sectoral share in 
employment while the second term is the aggregate of the changes in sectoral labor share between 
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the base year and the end-period weighted by the base year's productivity level. The first term is 
the structural change effect while the second term is the technological progress effect. 
It follows that when equation (16) holds, a positive contribution to overall productivity results. 
The third term which represents the dynamic effect, is the aggregate of the inner product of the 
relative changes in productivity levels and employment shares across all sectors of the economy. 
The usefulness of the dynamic term is an issue of debate in the literature . McMillan et al. 
(2014) argue that the process that generates the dynamic term means that it will often be negatively 
signed and as such will be difficult to interpret. They argue, for instance, that when agricultural 
productivity growth is positive and the labor share in agriculture is falling, the term is negative 
even though on average the reallocation of agricultural labor into more productive sectors of the 
economy results in a positive contribution of structural change to overall productivity growth. 
Furthermore, structural change by its nature is dynamic and as such not useful to refer to a part of 
it as 'static' and the other as dynamic. However, Fagerberg (2000) argues that the dynamic term 
which captures the aggregate effect of the interactions between employment and productivity 
changes could be used to test Baumol's ( 1967) structural bonus or burden hypothesis. Specifically, 
the hypothesis that when employment shifts away from more productive to less productive sectors 
then equation (17) will hold. 
Lt=1CYt - Yo)Cot - 80) < 0 . . . . . . . . . . . .  ( 17) 
But notice that the dynamic term could be positive even when both terms are negative- when 
both employment shares and productivity levels are falling, and thus will be misleading to term 
this as a structural bonus. 
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3.7 Time-Invariant Weig hts 
Beyond the debate on the usefulness of decomposing the structural change term, a strand of the 
literature argues, a precise estimation often results when the weights assigned to the terms are 
made time-invariant. Specifically, Syrquin ( 1988) argues that to make the decomposition invariant 
to base years, the period average can be used as weights as shown in equation (18) 
Where ji and 8 are the period arithmetic averages of sectoral productivity and employment shares. 
3.8 Standard Shift-Share Decompos ition 
The argument of assigning time-invariant weights to keep employment shares or productivity 
constant appears weak in view of the assumption that underlies the concept of decomposition. To 
hold a factor constant means to hold it at its initial levels. However, taking the period average does 
the opposite, as period averages may be higher or lower than the initial value of the factor under 
consideration. In view of the foregoing, we adopt the standard approach as expressed in equation 
( 19) 
n n 
LlY = I 8i Llyi + I YiLl8i ... ... ... . .  (19) 
i=l i=l 
The first term on the right-hand side is the technological progress effect and the second term is the 
"structural change effect". This method spreads the dynamic component of equation ( 15) over the 
two main components by implicitly weighing the terms' shares of the dynamic term by their 
relative contributions to the overall sectoral productivity growth. The technological progress effect 
measures a change in the productivity of a sector i while keeping share of employment constant. 
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While the structural change effect measures changes in sectoral employment share, weighted by 
the end-period productivity level. This is the approach of McMillan et al. (2014). 
3.9 Computing Reg ional Productivity 
To avoid obtaining results that are biased towards countries with highest absolute contributions to 
the region's productivity, the aggregate productivity for the region is computed by weighting each 
country's sectoral productivity level by the ratio of the country's total labor force (employment) 
to the region's aggregate labor force This is based on the assumptions in the Matsuyama ( 1992) 
model outlined earlier that the country's population equals labor supply. Our regional 
computations exclude the dynamic term. However, for the country-level analysis, we use the 
equation (15) as robustness check. Also, countries that do not have data on all sectors of the 
economy are excluded from the analysis. 
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CHAPTER4 
Results and Discussion 
4. 1 Employment Trends and Productivity Accounting 
4.1.0 Inte rse ctora l Prod uctivity Ga ps 
The countries in our sample seem to exhibit wide variations in intersectoral productivity. 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between intersectoral productivity gaps and the average 
productivity in 2001. Our findings suggest that countries with higher average productivity levels 
in the tend to have lower intersectoral productivity gaps. These are mostly countries in our Asian 
sample :  Malaysia, Indonesia, China and Thailand. The only non-Asian countries in this group of 
high-productivity-low-gap countries are Mauritius, Mexico, Chile and Costa Rica. On the other 
hand, the countries with the largest productivity gaps are mainly in the Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Latin America. While this is far from providing even the weakest grounds for any causal 
relationship, it shows the tendency for productivity growth in less developed countries to converge 
with developed economies as intersectoral productivity gaps are eliminated. 
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A simple cross-section regression of sectoral average productivity on the coefficient of variation 
of productivities indeed produces highly significant negative correlation when estimated without 
any controls as shown in Table 4.  
Table 4: Simple Regression Average Productivity 
Gap 
Constant 1 . .03 * * *  
Robust Std. Error 
3 .98 
0 .076 
Confidence Band 
-22 . 89 
0 .87 
-6.54 
1 . 1 8  
But to what extent does the existence of these gaps provide a possibility for productivity 
convergence between advanced developing countries like China and the least developed ones? 
How do these gaps provide room for the reallocation of labor from less productive sectors like 
agriculture to more productive ones? The next section discusses these trends between 1980 and 
2010. 
4.1.1 L ab or Reallocation and Deag riculturaliz ation 
In Table 5, we compare the regional rates of labor reallocation between 1980 and 2010. 
Table 5 Deagriculturalization and Labor Reallocation Between 1980 and 2010 
Decline in Agriculture 
Top Receiving Sectors 
Trade 
Community Services 
Construction 
Transport 
Finance 
Manufacturing 
Total Share of Labor Received by Sectors 
Average Share Productivity for Receiving Sectors 
ASIA LAC 
-24@ - 1 6% 
7% 
7% 
6% 
2% 
1 %  
23% 
28% 
9% 
3% 
2% 
3% 
1 7% 
22% 
Region-wide Most Productive Sectors 
Most Productive Sector's Share of Productivity 
Change in Sectoral Employment 
23 
54% 
-0.2% 
42% 
-0 .3% 
SSA 
-4% 
3% 
2% 
5% 
5% 
25% 
-0 .8% 
CHINA 
-32% 
6% 
1 2% 
5% 
2% 
5% 
29% 
3 8% 
27% 
24% 
We find that in many of the developing countries, the most highly productive sectors have been 
unable to absorb labor leaving the less productive sectors. Our Asian sample has been shedding 
most of its agricultural labor faster than other developing countries. It released roughly 24% of its 
agricultural labor almost all of which was (assumed) to be absorbed in trade, community, 
construction, transport, and finance services. In Latin America, the rate of de-agriculturalization 
was just 67% of that experienced in Asia while Sub-Saharan Africa' s deagriculturalization is 
barely 1 7% of what Asia experienced. In Asia, the sectors that received most of the labor released 
from other sectors contributed an average of 28% of the region 's  overall productivity over the 
period. In Latin America, the receiving sectors contributed 22% of overall productivity while in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, labor lost from agriculture were absorbed by sectors whose average 
contribution to the region' s overall productivity was just 5% over the period. 
Conversely, Africa' s mining sector which is the most productive with a quarter share in regional 
productivity, lost almost 1 % of its labor force- an indication that labor has been moving in the 
wrong direction per the assumptions of the dual-model economy. Of course, this estimation is 
crude and does not identify the exact dynamics of labor reallocation and sectoral absorption of 
labor but it offers a broad insight into deagriculturalization as a key to growth. So, what if Sub­
Saharan Africa experienced a deagriculturalization process almost as fast as did Asia? This 
information provides the basis for our counterfactual simulations in Section 4. 5 
4.1.2 E ffects of Structural Chang e on Growth 
In Table 6, we present our findings from the productivity growth decomposition at the regional 
level . To give a detailed insight into the findings, we first discuss the general trend at the regional 
level and then country-level based on estimations derived using equation ( 19). The results of this 
decomposition are reported in Table 7 and 8 in the appendix. However, we also use equation ( 1 5) 
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as a robustness check, the results of which are reported in Table 9 and Table 1 0 . In the following 
discussion, we shall refer to the period from 1 980 to 2000 as the first period and from 200 1 to 20 1 0  
as the second period. 
Table 6: Decomposition of Weighted Productivity Growth by Region 
Until 2000 After 2000 
Total Structural Change (%) Technological Progress Total Structural Change (%) Technological Progress 
ASIA 1 4% 1 6% -2% 3 1 % 9% 
LAC 1 .4% 3% - 1 .6% 1 4% 1 2% 
MENA 3 8% 1 9% 1 8% 24% -3% 
SSA 1 7% -7% 24% 34% 24% 
4.1.3 As ia 
In Asia, we find that in the first period, structural change has made greater positive 
contributions to productivity growth than technological progress. Growth in the second period was 
led by technological progress although structural change still contributed positively to growth. 
Specifically, in the second period, the contribution of structural change declined from 1 6% to 9% 
while the contribution of technological progress to productivity growth increased from a negative 
2% to 22%. McMillan et al . (20 1 4) found similar results between 1 990 and 2005 , where 
technological change contributed 33 1 % of the total 3 87% increase in productivity in Asia. The 
large productivity growth can, however, be attributed mostly to the inclusion of the high-income 
economies of Taiwan, South Korea, Honk Kong and Singapore in the Asian sample. 
The findings from the first period about the role of structural change confirms the theory 
that in the early years of growth, the economy is characterized by intersectoral productivity gaps 
from which positive contributions to growth, stirred by labor reallocation emerge. The first period 
marks the early days of economic reforms in Asia. For example, in the mid- 1 960 ' s  India underwent 
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22% 
2% 
27% 
1 0% 
a wave of World Bank-ordained liberalization reforms almost all of which were reversed in the 
early 1 970 ' s  with a renewed focus on an import substitution approach to growth. According to 
Pursell ( 1 992) the impact of this approach was significantly felt by firms that needed to import 
machinery and technology needed for production. Thus, while the economy diversified with 
several sectors producing goods and services that ensured self-sufficiency, production was not 
efficient owing to the nature of technology in use by industries. Thus, structural change rather than 
technological progress had a vital role to play in this growth process .  Subsequently, restrictions on 
importation of capital equipment and machinery were steadily relaxed around 1 976, allowing the 
various sectors of the economy to pick up steady growth rates .  Indeed, our decomposition confirms 
that between 1 980 and 2000, technological progress in India accounted for roughly 50% of the 
83% growth in productivity with the remaining 33% attributable to structural change. Thus, labor 
lost from agriculture and other less productive sectors to the more productive sectors of the 
economy were complemented by technological progress within the sectors that helped to spur 
overall growth. India' s  growth in the second period continued to be led by technological progress 
which accounted for 53% of the 66% growth in productivity. Figure 2 shows the relationship 
between share in agricultural employment and overall productivity. As can be seen, decline in the 
share of agricultural employment in India is generally associated with increases in overall 
productivity. Malaysia, Thailand and China all exhibit similar trends; where deagriculturalization 
has been associated with growth in aggregate productivity. 
Panagariya (2005) notes that reforms in China began in the late 1 970s under the ' family 
responsibility system' which provided incentives for households to produce more than what was 
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needed to meet government-mandated quotas in a bid to sell the surplus products for personal 
income gains. This led to growth in incomes, development of non-homothetic preferences and 
consequently the springing up of light and heavy industries . This coupled with the trade 
liberalization policies and creation of an investor-friendly environment led to the growth of 
industries and rapid deagriculturalization as firms took advantage of relatively cheap labor. 
Consequently, deagriculturalization over the period of our study stood at 32% in China and 
approximately 29% of the labor lost in agriculture found employment in sectors which contributed 
nearly 3 8% of average productivity. Again, per our first period estimations, China recorded a 
growth of about 270% in productivity levels, roughly 233% of which was due to technological 
progress with the rest coming from the structural change . In the second period, productivity 
growth was still fueled by technological progress which accounted for nearly 1 05% of the 1 43% 
growth in productivity. 
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Overall, while growth in China, Malaysia and India in the first period were led by technological 
progress, growth in Indonesia, and Thailand were led by structural change although technological 
progress also made observable positive contributions to productivity growth. However, in all six 
developing Asian economies, growth in the second period productivity was led by technological 
progress which made significantly positive contributions to productivity growth as shown in 
Figure 6 of the appendix. This aligns with the argument of Easterly and Levine (200 1 ) ;  large 
variations in productivity and hence growth patterns are accounted for by improvements in 
production processes resulting from technological and other best practices learned from the 
developed world which allows firms to maximize output at lower costs rather than changes in 
allocative efficiency. 
4.1.4 L atin A merica 
Productivity growth in Latin America was the lowest for the entire sample in the first period. 
However, the share of structural change in total productivity growth for the period was higher than 
what Sub-Saharan Africa experienced over the same period. Specifically, productivity grew by 
approximately 1 .4% in the first period with a decline in technological progress leading to about 
1 . 1  % decline in productivity growth. This was however offset by the 2 .5% growth in productivity 
resulting from structural change. This was a period when oil-exporting Latin American economies 
having ridden on the back of high oil prices of the 1 970 ' s  to accumulate unsustainable loans­
what became known as the Latin American debt crises of the 1 980s.  Many of these economies 
then began to experience the recession and a period of sluggish and even negative growth rates in 
many economies except for Chile and Colombia (Felix, 1 990; Loayza & Fajnzylber, 2005 ;  Sims 
& Romero, 20 14 ;  Weller, 200 1 ) . According to Felix ( 1 990), productivity declined below the 
1 970s levels as urban wages declined causing mass labor migration. In Argentina, Brazil and Peru 
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capital investment per worker dropped below the 1 970 levels and in extreme cases like that of 
Mexico, Argentina and Peru stocks of human and physical capital experienced negative growths 
due to huge declines in public and private investment, poor maintenance of public infrastructure 
and inadequate funding of social services (Felix, 1 990) . Thus, even when labor moved out of less 
productive sectors, general declines in investment and low output levels meant that they could not 
be absorbed into productive sectors .  Figure 3 is a plot of the relationship between 
deagriculturalization and aggregate productivity growth in our Latin American sample. As can be 
seen, deagriculturalization over the period has not been associated with any discernible growth in 
productivity. 
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In fact, for most countries, productivity remained almost insensitive to declines in agricultural 
share in employment. This was indeed the region' s  ' lost decade. '  However, the growth 
decelerations seen in the 1 980-2002 period also coincides with similar growth patterns around the 
world (Solimano & Soto, 2005) and as such may be attributable to external shocks as well . But the 
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impact of these external shocks were magnified as they interacted with domestic rigidities and 
macroeconomic vulnerabilities (Singh, 2005).  In the second period, however, our estimations 
reveal that growth was led primarily by technological progress which contributed 1 2% of the total 
1 4% in growth with the remainder coming from structural change. This marked the period of 
recovery for many Latin American economies after a quarter century of economic stagnation and 
growth declines. At this time, resource-hungry Asian economies had caused a surge in world 
commodity prices from which many Latin American economies benefited, taking growth rates to 
the pre- 1 980 levels (Fishlow & Bacha, 20 1 0) .  Mining and utilities services remained the most 
productive sectors over the period with a total of 63% share of average productivity but because 
of high capital-intensity of these sectors, they are unable to absorb much of the labor coming out 
of agriculture. In fact, these two sectors, altogether, lost about 0.2% of their labor force by the end 
period while trading services which held only 4% of total productivity over the period, gained 
about 9% in employment shares- clear misallocation of labor. 
Our analysis so far, does not lend support to the hypothesis that growth in the developing 
economies of Latin America has been structural-change driven. In fact, in some cases, it has been 
growth reducing as show Figure 7 . But the story is far from homogenous when a country-level 
disaggregated decomposition is conducted. 
4.1.5 Star C as es of C hile and C olomb ia 
Chile and Colombia were the only two Latin American economies that experienced growth 
in productivity in the first period. In the case of Chile growth was led by technological progress 
which accounted for roughly 25% of the total 34% growth in the first period whereas in Colombia 
productivity growth was led by structural change which accounted for 2% of the total 1 % growth 
and served to offset growth declines caused by downward technological change. Chile underwent 
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several significant reforms after 1 982 following the fall in copper prices and the early 1 980s 
recession in the United States .  These reforms sought to encourage the spirit of free market as 
interest and inflation rates fell. This resulted in increased domestic savings, more investments and 
a measured reliance on market signals for production decisions which in turn led to sustained 
increases in economic growth at a time when the region struggled with stagnation as the country 
continued to diversify its export base and thus domestic production (Fishlow & Bacha, 20 1 0; 
Kurtz, 200 1 )  
4.1.6 N ort h Afr ica (MENA) 
Before we proceed it is worth noting that our estimations for the MENA region is based on a nine-
sector economy without a community services sector for the lack of data. Our analysis can be 
understood as an imperfect approximation of the two economies under study; Egypt and Morocco. 
The MENA countries experienced productivity growth in both periods although the contribution 
of structural change was negative in the second period. In Morocco, even though structural change 
contributed positively to productivity growth, decline in technological progress led to an overall 
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negative growth in productivity between 1 980 and 2000 . After 2000, however, both structural 
change and technological progress caused an improvement of 2 1  % in productivity with 5% of this 
attributable to structural change. Egypt on the other hand experienced a 57% increase in 
productivity growth within the first period with only 7% of this coming from structural change. 
After 200,0 however, structural change reduced productive growth even though technological 
change continued to be positive. The effects of structural change on productivity growth are 
therefore mixed for Egypt and Morocco but of course not much discussions can be held on this 
subject in the absence of data for one sector of the economy. However, what can be said is that 
while deagriculturalization in Morocco has been associated with growth in aggregate productivity, 
no discernible pattern can be observed for Egypt as shown in Figure 4 .  
4.1. 7 Sub-Saharan Afr ica 
Sub-Saharan Africa experienced productivity growth in both periods, yet structural change made 
a significant positive contribution only in the second period when it accounted for about 24% of 
the total 34% growth in productivity. In the first period, intersectoral labor reallocation led to a 7% 
decrease in productivity growth even though technological progress was enough to offset the 
decline caused by structural change .  Like Latin America, many of the Sub-Saharan economies 
experienced shocks ranging from the high import prices and declining commodity prices to severe 
droughts that hampered domestic food supply. Upon interaction with weak macroeconomic 
fundamentals caused in part by failed import-substitution strategies, the effects of these shocks 
were magnified. Government-run corporations that dominated most African economies were 
operating at costs that were 50- 1 00% higher than in their South Asian counterparts. High labor 
costs, due in part to market distortions arising from price controls acted as strong disincentives for 
private investment in the region (Elbadawi, Ghura, & Uwuj aren, 1 992; Heidhues & Obare, 20 1 1 )  
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Later, under the tutelage of the IMF and the World Bank, many of these countries began to 
restructure their economies as part of large scale structural adjustment programs. These reforms 
led to increased private sector participation through financial sector and exchange rate 
liberalization and most importantly labor market legislation (Basu, Calamitsis, & Ghura, 2000; 
Calamitsis, 1 999) . While the literature is in disagreement regarding the effect of these programs 
on economic growth, Beneria ( 1 999) notes that the focus of structural adjustment policies on 
deregulation of labor and capital markets often leads to reconfiguration of production functions 
with emphasis on new technologies, reorganization of labor processes and overall efficiency which 
helps to ensure productivity growth. On the other hand, trade liberalization means that labor lost 
from less productive sectors could not find employment in manufacturing as most of these firms 
collapsed in the face of competition with imports. It is therefore not surprising that structural 
change had a negative impact on productivity growth during this period. As Figure 5 shows the 
relationship between deagriculturalization and aggregate productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
very dissimilar across countries. 
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While deagriculturalization in Ghana, Botswana, Kenya and Senegal has been associated with 
growth in aggregate productivity, the relationship is far from clear in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Malawi 
and Tanzania. Even though growth in the second period was largely fueled by technological 
progress, a country-level decomposition reveals that structural change played dominant roles at 
least in Tanzania, Malawi and Nigeria and very significant roles as in the case of Ethiopia as shown 
in Figure 6. Conversely, in our first period analysis, structural change was growth-reducing in 
these countries.  But generally, of all the regions studied so far, deagriculturalization is slowest in 
Africa. Over the period covered in our sample, agricultural share of employment averaged 63 % 
while its contribution to overall productivity averaged 1 %. Between 1 980 and 20 1 0, agricultural 
employment fell from 63% to 59% whereas sectoral share in overall productivity declined from 
about 1 % to 0.4%. On the hand mining, utility, construction, trade and finance which altogether 
held an average of 82% of overall productivity only had 1 8% of the total labor force . This raises 
an interesting question. What would be the potential growth rates in Africa or Latin America if 
labor reallocation patterns followed those experienced in our Asian sample? To answer these 
questions, we conduct a counterfactual experiment using the assumption that labor reallocation in 
Africa and Latin America are the same as those of the 1 )  Asian sample and 2) China. 
4. 1 .8 C ount erfa ct ual Si mul ati on 
Table 1 1  the results from our counterfactual growth rates in productivity for Sub-Saharan Africa 
and Latin America if labor reallocation trends followed the same pattern in Asia. 
SSA 
LAC 
Total 
59% 
37% 
Table 11 Counter/actual Decomposition of Productivity Growth 
With Asia 's Labor Reallocation Trends 
Until 2000 2000 
Structural Change (%) Tech. Progress Total Structural Change (%) Tech. Progress 
34% 25% 40% 
15% 22% 26% 
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19% 21% 
8% 18% 
The results are obtained from decomposing the rates of growth that occur after regional aggregate 
sectoral labor shares in Africa and Latin America were replaced with the Asian data. We found 
that if the labor reallocation in Sub-Saharan Africa followed the patterns in Asia over the sample 
period, growth in productivity would have been 42 percentage points higher in the first period and 
about 6% higher in the second period. More importantly the hypothetical structural change 
contribution to productivity growth is 4 1  % higher than the actual structural change observed in the 
first period. While structural change contribution to productivity growth in the hypothetical case 
was slightly lower than the actual case of the second period, it was still positive and quite 
significant. In Latin America, the hypothetical case shows growth rates that are almost 3 7 
percentage points higher than the actual case in the first period and about 2 percentage points 
higher in the second period. In both hypothetical periods, structural change made positive 
contributions to productivity growth. 
The second experiment is then conducted using the specific case of China which 
experienced the highest rate of deagriculturalization in our sample. We present our findings in 
Table 1 2 . Using hypothetical employment shares data from China, we find that both Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Latin America would experience higher than the actual productivity growths if 
deagriculturalization in both regions followed the patterns observed in China. 
Table 12 Counter/actual Decomposition of Productivity Growth with China 's Labor Reallocation Trends 
Until 2000 After 2000 
Total Structural Change (%) Tech. Progress Total Structural Change (%) Tech. Progress 
SSA 49% 19% 29% 46% 26% 20% 
LAC 37% 13% 25% 30% 12% 18% 
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4.1.9 Robu s tnes s Chec k 
The approach used thus far, has decomposed productivity strictly into a ' technological progress' 
and ' structural change term' . Each of these terms a change in either productivity or employment 
shares while holding the other constant. To test the robustness of our findings we allow follow the 
approach of Fagerberg (2000) by introducing a third term that allows both employment shares and 
productivity to vary simultaneously as in equation ( 1 5) .  This generates what we call the ' dynamic 
term' . Our first and second period findings are reported in Tables 9 and 1 0  of the appendix. The 
results suggest that magnitude of growth in both periods remain the same with the same signs as 
those found using the standard shift-share decomposition method. However, as expected the static 
component of the structural change term came out smaller than those obtained under the standard 
decomposition. Again, cognizant of the current debate on the usefulness of the dynamic term, we 
do not attach any policy significance to the term but if the structural burden or bonus hypothesis 
of Baumol ( 1 967) is anything to go by, then the results from this analysis suggest that structural 
change has been growth-reducing in all of the countries under study except for China and India in 
both periods and Egypt in the second period. 
4.2 Structural Change: Empirical Model and Results 
As we have noted in the preceding discussion, many of the countries in our sample have 
experienced a slow deagriculturalization process during which labor has generally been released 
into less productive sectors rendering the size and contribution of structural change small and often 
negative . So, what factors drive these patterns observed in developing countries? What are the 
determinants of the contribution of structural change to economic growth? McMillan et al . (20 1 4) 
note that globalization has played a fundamental role in changing sectoral shares in employment 
and productivity in many developing countries.  Globalization has helped eliminate quantitative 
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restrictions on imports and integrated domestic financial systems into the global economy which 
has in turn enhanced cross-border cash flows, foreign direct investment and trade in goods and 
services. The elimination of trade barriers has led to the collapse of many domestic manufacturing 
industries in the face of international competition. It is therefore natural to attribute the declines in 
manufacturing employment shares to globalization. However, if a single factor were ultimately 
and solely responsible for the observed patterns, then the contribution of structural change would 
be homogenous across our sample. This contradicts our findings and the stylized facts. As we have 
demonstrated throughout this study, there is a diminishing effect of growth on structural change 
where countries that benefited significantly from structural change in the first period experienced 
smaller magnitude of structural bonuses in the second period as they experienced higher growth 
episodes. Other factors must thus be responsible for this .  Swiecki (20 1 4) for example finds that 
for developing countries, the existence of non-homothetic preferences, intersectoral trade and 
wage differentials play a central role in determining the reallocation of labor out of agriculture . 
Uy, Yi, and Zhang (20 1 3 )  in their study of the South Korean economy found that shock processes 
mediated through non-homothetic preferences and trade openness significantly explained the 
changes in sectoral shares in employment. McMillan et al . (20 1 4) in an exploratory analysis found 
an inverse relationship between labor market rigidity and the contribution of structural change to 
productivity growth. In view of the foregoing discussion, it becomes relevant to consider the role 
of domestic conditions such as extent of rigidity of the labor market, openness to trade, domestic 
fixed capital formation, and quality of human capital among others in each economy. 
4.2.1 T he R eg res s ion M odel 
To answer test these ideas empirically, we run a regression of the form: 
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where the left-hand term is a more-frequent structural change term computed on a five-year basis 
from 1 980 to 2009, Xi is a vector of country-level covariates that potentially affect the magnitude 
and direction of the structural change contribution of productivity growth while Ei is the 
idiosyncratic error term that is assumed to possess a strictly exogeneous relationship with the 
explanatory variables. Since our data is a combination of cross-section and time series, a panel 
regression will be helpful in controlling for country-specific effects which may be correlated with 
other explanatory variables in our specification. Panel models can be ran using assumptions about 
either the fixed or random effects . The two make unique assumptions about country-level effects 
that can hardly be observed by the econometrician. The fixed-effects model assumes that the 
country-level effects are non-random and that they may be correlated with the regressors over time 
whereas the random effects model does not assume non-randomness of the country-specific 
effects, it does assume that these effects may be uncorrelated with the regressors. To understand 
the nature of the country-specific effects, the Hausman test is employed to test the validity of either 
of these assumptions . Specifically, if the random-effects assumption holds, then estimates from 
the random effects model is deemed more efficient whereas estimates from the random effects 
model will be inconsistent if the assumption does not hold (Clark & Linzer, 20 1 5 ;  Djankov & 
Hoekman, 2000; Hausman & Taylor, 1 98 1 ) . 
4.2.2 Des cription of V ariab les 
Our dependent variable is computed as the structural change over five year periods from 1 980 to 
2009. This allows us to capture the dynamism involved in the process of structural change itself. 
Our independent variables include a measure of labor market rigidity and two lags of it, share of 
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agriculture in employment at the beginning of each period, imports, exports and the sum of both 
as shares of GDP, and domestic investment as a proxy for physical accumulation. We also proxy 
human capital accumulation with the percentage of eligible population enrolled in secondary 
education. 
Specifically, our measure of labor market rigidity comes from the Campos and Nugent 
(20 1 2) labor market rigidity (LAMRIG) index database.  The index which is an extended version 
of the Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) is computed as a sum of 
the factor scores of three sub-components; the availability of alternative employment contracts 
such as part-time contracts, the conditions of employment such as mandatory rest, maximum hours 
of work without overtime, overtime pay premium, leaves for holidays and maternity, etc . and the 
extent of job security such as restrictions on dismissal, mandatory notice periods, severance 
payments etc . The consensus in the empirical literature is that labor market rigidity results in sub­
optimal levels of productivity growth and high unemployment (Parello, 20 1 1 ) .  Economies that 
suffer rigid labor markets have also been found to experience downturns pre-reforms and slower 
growth post-reforms (Forteza & Rama, 2006) . However, if standard growth models are anything 
to go by, then the relationship between the conditions of the labor market and growth is far from 
direct. Kharroubi (2006) for example argues that even though rigidity does not directly affect the 
fundamental sources of capital accumulation such as saving and investment, its effect may be 
mediated through an interaction between labor contracts and financial markets at the firm level. 
Specifically, rigidity allows firms to offer labor contracts that tie wages to productivity. The overall 
effect is high performance that allows firms to make profits and reduce borrowing from financial 
markets while simultaneously increasing the aggregate stock of savings available in the economy. 
It is in view of this that we control for the effects of labor market rigidity. The index is on an 
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increasing rigidity scale from 0 to 3 . 5 .  A cursory look at the summary statistics in Table 1 3  shows 
that the Latin American countries had relatively more rigid markets over the period under study, 
with Venezuela scoring 2 .45 in the early 1 980 ' s  before declining to about 2 .305 in the late 2000 ' s .  
Brazil, Costa Rica and Mexico all scored above 2 . 1 over the period. On the other end of  the 
spectrum is Malaysia who scored roughly between 0 .8  and 0 .87  over the period. Botswana also 
declined from 1 . 1  in the early 1 980 ' s  to 0 . 88  in the late 2000 ' s .  
The measure of  agricultural share in employment at the beginning of  the period i s  taken 
from our own computations using the GGDC 1 0-sector database. Imports of goods and services is 
taken from the WDI and it represents the dollar value of all goods such as merchandise, freight, 
insurance and royalties. It also includes the value of services as communication, construction, 
financial, and government services. Investment on the other hand is proxied by data on gross fixed 
capital formation drawn from the WDI. It includes land improvements, plant, machinery, and 
equipment purchases, the construction of roads, railways, and public, private, commercial and 
industrial buildings. In keeping with the literature, we then proxy the country' s  level of human 
capital accumulation in each period with the total enrollment in secondary education, regardless 
of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official secondary education age (Group, 
20 1 2) .  
4.2.3 H aus man Tes t 
Per our test results reported in Table 1 4, we are unable to reject the null that the differences in 
estimates are not systematic .  Thus, the available information indicates that the random effects 
model provides efficient and consistent estimates .  
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Table 14 Hausman Test 
LM Rigidity 
Share of Agriculture in Employment 
. ---- �--
Imports (% of GDP) 
Investment (% of GDP) 
Human Capital 
LM Rigidity1-1 
LM Rigidity1-2 
i_i (7 )  = 7 .66, Prob  > 0.3638 
Fixed Effects 
0 .044 
0 .640 
0 .00 1 
0 .007 
0 .004 
-0.073 
0 .003 
Random Effects Difference Standard Error 
0 .08 1 -0.03 7 0 .090 
-�---
0 . 1 08 0 .532  0 .309 
0 .0004 0 .00 1 0 .002 
0 .004 0 .003 0 .003 
0 .0003 0 .004 0 .002 
-0.07 1 -0.002 0 .0 1 2  
0 .039 -0.03 5 0 .03 1 
However, we report both the random and fixed effects models to allow for comparisons of the 
estimates derived when different assumptions are made about the country-specific effects that 
determine the contribution of structural change to productivity growth 
4.2.4 R andom E ffects Model 
The results of our random effects model are presented in Table 15. In model 1 of Table 15, we run 
the regression without the lagged values of labor market rigidity and with no regional dummies. 
In model 2 the regional dummies are included for Latin America, MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In models 3 and 4 we introduce one and two-period lags of the rigidity index to control for the 
effects of previous episodes of rigidity on the labor reallocation process and hence, structural 
change. First, previous episodes ofrigidity in the labor market may affect future decisions of labor. 
Agricultural workers who could not find employment in a more productive industry in time t - 1 
or t - 2 due to rigidities in the labor market, may give up on further looking for employment in 
time, t. This further slows the labor reallocation process .  Finally, in model 5 we drop the MENA 
region from our analysis because the structural terms are computed based on 9-sectors instead of 
1 0  as in the rest of our sample. Since the dependent variable measures the contribution of structural 
change to productivity growth, the coefficients in our models can be interpreted as the structural 
change returns to productivity per a unit change in the variable under consideration. 
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Table 15: Random Effects Model ( 1 ) (2) (3 ) (4) (5)  
Dependent Variable: Structural Change Term 
LM Rigidity 0 .045 0 .03 8  0 .075 * 0 .073 * 0 .080* *  
(0 .03 0) (0 .045) (0 .046) (0 .050) (0 .043) 
Share of Agriculture in Employment 0 . 1 22* *  0. 1 42* *  0 . 1 06* *  0 . 1 22* *  0 . 1 08* *  
(0 .056) (0 .068) (0 .044) (0 .057) (0 .063) 
Imports (% of GDP) 0 .0005 0 .0004 0 .00 1 0 .00 1 0 .0004 
(0.00 1 ) (0.00 1 )  (0.00 1 ) (0.008) (0 .00 1 ) 
Investment (% of GDP) 0 .003 * *  0 .004* *  0 .005 * *  0 .004* *  0 .004* *  
(0.002) (0.002) (0 .002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Human Capital -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0003 
(0 .00 1 ) (0.00 1 ) (0 .0007) (0.00 1 ) (0 .00 1 )  
LM Rigidityt-1 -0.039* -0.0590 -0.07 1 
(0.023) (0 .052) (0.054) 
LM Rigidityt-2 0.0325 0 .039 
(0 .04 1 (0 .042) 
Constant -0. 1 84* * *  -0.204* *  -0. 1 99* *  0 . 1 88* *  -0.2 1 1 * *  
(0 .075) (0. 1 00) (0 .088) (0.078) (0.086) 
Regional Dummies No Yes No No Exel. 
MENA 
Sample Size 1 1 4 1 1 4 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 09 
Within R2 0. 1308 0 . 1346 0 .1592 0. 1429 0 . 1 505 
Between R2 0. 3734 0 .3646 0 .3544 0 .3847 0.3906 
Overall 0.2102 0 .2105 0 .2187 0 .2209 0.2259 
Standard errors in parenthesis ** p < 0. 05, * * *  p < 0. 001 
Our initial findings show that the conditions of the labor market appear not to have any significant 
impact on the contribution that structural make to productivity growth. However, it turns out 
positive and significant below the 0 .05 level after we control for the effects of previous episodes 
of rigidity on structural change. The positive sign contradicts our a priori expectations in view of 
the well documented negative effects of rigidity in the literature. Specifically, after the introduction 
of lagged values of labor market rigidity, a unit increase in the rigidity index, leads to a 0 .07 
percentage point increase in the structural change returns to productivity, on average. 
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However, a careful examination of the patterns of labor reallocation and structural change 
in our sample shows that rigidity could be structural change-enhancing. For one thing, labor market 
rigidity stalls the process of inefficient labor re-allocation we have observed; where labor is 
released into less productive sectors. Conversely, this can be understood as a 0.07 percentage point 
decrease in a potential "structural burden". The magnitude of the returns rises slightly to 0 .08 
percentage points after the two MENA countries are dropped from our analysis but remains 
significant at the 0 .05 level. Consistent with the literature, we find that countries that enter any 
given period with a higher proportion of their labor force in agriculture, tend to experience 
productivity gains from structural change. Specifically, a percentage point increase in agricultural 
employment share leads to a 0 . 1 percentage point increase in the structural change returns to 
productivity. This underscores the argument of the extant development literature; countries that 
start out with ' surplus' labor in less productive sectors- whether in agriculture or in tradeable 
services, can leverage on this to boost productivity growth by releasing them into more productive 
sectors. Figure 8 in the appendix shows that agricultural share in employment over the period 
experienced a downward trend in all countries except in Nigeria where it saw an upward trend. 
The other variable that stays consistent and significant across all four specifications is 
investment. Even though the co-efficient of investment turns out positive and significant below 
the 0 .05 level, it yields a meager 0 .003 percentage points increase in the structural change-returns 
to productivity, for every percentage point increase in investment. The contribution of investment 
stays small and significant across all specifications. This is explained by the nature in which the 
structural change term is computed; a change in sectoral labor shares while holding investment­
induced productivity constant. In other words, a constant investment-induced change in 
productivity means investment has, at best, a very modest contribution to structural change. Our 
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human capital variable as well as the measure of imports of goods and services did not have 
significant impact on the structural change returns to productivity. In model 4, the only regional 
dummy that turned out significant was the Latin American dummy which was negative­
suggesting that the Latin American countries in our sample are less likely to suffer a structural 
change burden relative to Asian countries (the reference region) . 
4.2.5 Fix ed Eff ects Model 
Table 1 6  presents results the results of our fixed effect estimations. In model 1 we run the 
regression for all the countries in our sample. In model two, we introduce the lagged values of 
rigidity. In model 3 we exclude the MENA region from our analysis for the reasons stated earlier. 
The findings from this estimation are like those obtained under the random effects model. 
Precisely, we observe a significant effect of labor market rigidity only after the introduction of the 
lagged values of rigidity. Here again, the contemporaneous rigidity retains its positive coefficient 
after the MENA region is excluded. Agricultural employment share at the beginning of the period 
also turns out positive, with a percentage point increase in agricultural employment share, leading 
to about 0 .5  to 0 .6 percentage point increase in the structural change induced productivity. It 
remains positive and significant at the 0 .05 level across specifications. A percentage point increase 
in investment, however, leads to a relatively modest increase of about 0 .007 percentage points in 
the structural change returns to productivity. For the first time, our human capital variable becomes 
significant but only in model 2 and at the 0 . 1 0  significance level, where a percentage point increase 
in the ratio of enrolled secondary school students to the eligible population, leads to an average 
increase of about 0 .003 percentage points in the structural change returns to productivity. 
However, its significance diminishes after the MENA countries are dropped out of the analysis .  
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Table 1 6  Fixed Effects Model (1) (2) (3) 
Labor Market Rigidity Index 0.057 0.066* *  0 .044**  
(0 - 5)  (0.085) (0 .03 1 )  (0.02 1 )  
Share o f  Agriculture in Employment 0 .479 * *  0 .586 * *  0 .640**  
(0.272) (0.289) (0.3 1 6) 
Imports (% of GDP) 0.0002 0.0007 0.00 1 
(0 .002) (0 .002) (0.002) 
Investment (% of GDP) 0 .006 * *  0 .007 * *  0.007* * 
(0 .003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Human Capital 0.003 0 .003 * 0 .004 
(0 .002) (0 .002) (0.002) 
LM Rigidity1-1 -0.756 -0.073 
(0 .055) (0.006) 
LM Rigidity1-2 0.0 12  0 .003 
(0 .049) (0 .056) 
Constant -0 .565* *  -0.6 1 0 * * *  -0.6 1 6* *  
(0 .267) (0.282) (0.297) 
Regions All All Exel. MENA 
Sample Size 1 1 4 1 09 1 00 
Within R2 0.0703 0 . 1 0 1 7  0.2043 
Between R2 0.0645 0 .0569 0.0482 
Overall 0.03 1 8  0 .0283 0.0233 
Standard errors in parenthesis, *p< 0. 1 0, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0. 001 
4.2.6 Rob us tne s s  Che ck s 
To test the robustness of our results we re-estimate the random effects (RE) models 4 and fixed 
effects (FE) model 3 using trade openness, instead of imports in Table 17. We then use exports 
instead of imports in column I.  Across all specifications labor market rigidity index remains 
positively signed but only significant at the 0.1 level . Share of agriculture in employment at the 
start of the period and investment also continued to yield positive returns of structural change to 
productivity growth. The magnitudes of the co-efficients remain largely comparable to those 
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obtained earlier suggesting consistency in our estimates. We also conducted a joint test of 
significance for the three labor market rigidity coefficients but it did not turn out significant. The 
results are reported in Table 1 8  in the appendix. 
Table 1 7: Robustness Check RE FE I 
Labor Market Rigidity Index 0 .079* 0 .039 0 .082* 
(0 - 5) (0 .045) (0 .092) (0 .047) 
Share of Agriculture in Employment 0 . 1 08* 0 .552* *  0 . 1 1 3 * 
(0 .065) (0.263) (0 .067) 
Trade (% of GDP) 0 .0002 0 .0004 
(0 .0005) (0 .00 1 ) 
Exports (% of GDP) 0 .00 1 
(0 .00 1 ) 
Investment (% of GDP) 0 .004* *  0 .006* 0 .004* *  
(0 .002) (0 .003) (0 .02) 
Human Capital 0 .000 0 .003 -0.0003 
(0.00 1 ) (0 .002) (0.00 1 ) 
LM Rigidity1- 1 -0 .056 -0 .05 8 -0.072 
(0 .053) (0 .053) (0 .058) 
LM Rigidity1-2 0 .034  0 .006 0 .03 8 
(0 .043) (0 .049) (0 .046) 
Constant -0.209* *  -0 .529* *  -0.2 1 6* *  
(0 .094) (0 .260) (0 .092) 
Regions Exel .  MENA Exel .  Exel .  MENA 
MENA 
Sample Size 108  1 08 1 00 
Within R2 0. 1 470 0 . 1 966 0 . 1 584 
Between R2 0.3675 0 . 1 349 0 .3 8 1 8  
Overall 0.2 1 66 0 . 1 1 88 0.2273 
Standard errors in parenthesis, *p< 0. 1 0, ** p < 0.05, * * *  p < 0. 001 
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CHAPTERS 
Conc lus ion and P olic y Rec ommendation 
Conc lus ion 
This paper empirically investigates the contribution of structural change to productivity growth in 
28 developing countries from Asia, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and the MENA regions . 
We explore the dual-economy model of Lewis ( 1 954) to hypothesize that (poor) countries that set 
out with higher shares of agriculture in employment and large intersectoral productivity gaps will 
benefit from productivity increases and hence growth, by releasing the surplus labor into more 
productive sectors, a phenomenon that can be called structural bonus . In line with the stylized 
facts, we find an inverse relationship between intersectoral productivity gaps and national income 
as proxied by average productivity. To tease out the impact of structural change on productivity 
growth, we split our series into two periods; 1 980 to 2000 and 200 1 to 20 1 0 . Using the shift-share 
decomposition method, we then compute the share of productivity growth that is attributed to 
' intrasectoral improvements in technology' ,  also called technological progress and the share of 
productivity growth accounted for by reallocation of labor across industries when productivity 
levels are held constant. Contrary to the theoretical development literature, we do not find solid 
country-level evidence that structural change has led the growth process in the developing world. 
The evidence from our analysis suggests a mixture of positive and negative and contributions 
across the entire sample. We also conduct a counterfactual simulation to observe hypothetical 
productivity growth patterns if the rest of the developing world had experienced Asia' s kind of 
labor reallocation which has generally yielded structural bonus. Our results confirm higher 
hypothetical growth rates than those observed in the actual cases. Having obtained the values for 
the structural change term, we proceed to a panel regression analysis to uncover the factors that 
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underlie the observed patterns. Again, contrary to the literature we find labor market rigidity to be 
structural change enhancing- as it stalls the wrong labor reallocation process that many countries 
in our sample experienced. Other determinants of structural bonus include the level of investment 
and the share of agricultural employment at the start of each period. These findings are consistent 
across several specifications and robustness checks. 
P olicy Recommendations 
Our paper provides useful insight into the development experiences of many developing countries. 
The lesson learnt is simple : productivity returns to structural change is not a default outcome of 
any labor reallocation process. For countries to benefit from labor reallocation, the market must 
be conditioned to direct labor from less productive to more productive sectors . First, the share of 
manufacturing in both aggregate employment and productivity is declining in many developing 
countries. If an industry possesses the potential to absorb excess labor, then there is an urgent need 
for policy to target expansion thereof, particularly in the manufacturing sectors of the developing 
world. But this alone would be insufficient, labor would require retraining to become employable 
to reverse the trend where labor keeps moving across less productive sectors. Mining and utilities 
production which have high productivity levels can be targeted for increased labor employment 
although they are likely to continue to be capital-intensive. We also recommend a new policy focus 
on tradeable services which tend to absorb much of the labor coming out of agriculture . If policies 
are designed to enhance access to credit, machinery and equipment by this sector, productivity 
levels could go up and growth could accelerate . 
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Appendix Al 
Table I :  International Standard Industrial Classification, Revision 3. 1 of the Ten-Sector Economy 
Economic Activities (ISIC Code) as Used in This Paper 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing (AtB); Agriculture 
Mining and Quarrying (C); 
Manufacturing (D); 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply (E); 
Construction (F); 
Wholesale and Retail Trade, Hotels and Restaurants (GtH); 
Transport, Storage, And Communication (I); 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services (JtK); 
Government Services (LtN); 
Community, Social and Personal Services (OtP) 
Table 2: List of Countries DATA COVERAGE 
Asia 
China (CHN) 1980-20 1 0  
India (IND) 1 980-20 1 0  
Indonesia (IDN) 1 980-20 1 0  
Malaysia (MYS) 1 980-20 1 0  
Philippines (PHL) 1 980-20 1 0  
Thailand (THA) 1 980-20 1 0  
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
Botswana (BWA) 1 980-20 1 0  
Ethiopia (ETH) 1 980-20 1 0  
Ghana (GHA) 1 980-20 1 0  
Kenya (KEN) 1 980-20 1 0  
Malawi (MWI) 1 980-20 1 0  
Mauritius (MUS) 1 980-20 1 0  
Nigeria (NGA) 1 980-20 1 0  
Senegal (SEN) 1 980-20 1 0  
South Africa (ZAF) 1 980-20 1 0  
Tanzania (TZA) 1 980-20 1 0  
Zambia (ZMB) 1 980-20 1 0  
Latin America 
Argentina (ARG) 1 980-20 1 0  
Bolivia (BOL) 1 980-20 1 0  
Brazil (BRA) 1 980-20 1 0  
Chile (CHL) 1 980-20 1 0  
Colombia (COL) 1 980-20 1 0  
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Construction 
Trading and Hospitality Services 
Transport Services 
Finance Services 
Government Services 
Community Services 
SECTORS COVERED EXEMPTIONS 
All 
All 
All 
All 
All 
All 
All 
All 
All 
All 
All 
All 
All 
All 
All 
All 
All 
All 
All 
All 
All 
All 
Costa Rica (CRI) 1 980-20 1 0  All 
Mexico (MEX) 1 980-20 1 0  All 
Peru (PER) 1 980-20 1 0  All 
Venezuela (VEN) 1 980-20 1 0  All 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
Egypt (EGY) 1 980-20 1 0  Nine Government 
Morocco (MOR) 1 980-20 1 0  Nine Government 
Table 3: Section I Summary Statistics 
Country MIN SECTOR MINIMUM MAX SECTOR MAXIMUM GAPS 
IND Agric. 1 6  Utility 793 0 .02 
PHL " 46 Utility 1 940 0 .02 
CHN Comm. 2 Mining 247 0.0 1 
MYS Govt 1 2  " 2343 0 .0 1  
IDN Agric. 5 ,682 " 785,855 0.0 1 
THA Govt 1 9  " 5 ,804 0 .0 1 
ARG LAC Comm. I O  " 670 0.03 
PER Agric .  4 " 276 0.03 
COL " 4,538  Utility 333 ,333 0 .03 
BOL " 5 Utility 3 3 7  0 .02 
BRA 3 Utility 2 1 7  0 .02 
VEN " 9 Mining 1 470 0 .02 
MEX " 3 1  " 3524 O .o l 
CRI " 1 ,333  Finance 1 2,9 1 5  0 .003 
CHL " 1 ,045 Mining 1 1 3 ,009 0.004 
MOR MENA Transp. 4 Finance 683 0.03 
EGY Govt 4 Mining 2446 0.02 
NGA ! SSA Transport 4 Mining 1 88,34 1 0.03 
BWA 
! Agric. 3 Mining 1 ,278 0.03 
ETH " 1 Finance 84 0.03 
TZA 236 " 20,602 0 .0 1  
KEN 4 1  Utility 1 ,602 0.03 
SEN 263 " 69, 1 43 0 .02 
ZAF " 9 " 42 1 0 .02 
GHA " 1 0  0.02 
MUS " 26 Mining 5 ,454 0 .0 1 
MWI " 1 3  " 1 , 806 0.03 
ZMB Community 464 Finance 1 1 1 ,65 1 0 .02 
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Table 7: First Period Growth Decomposition without Dynamic Term 
Country Region Total Structural Technological Progress 
CHN Asia 2.7 0 .38  2 .33  
THA Asia 1 .09 0 .58  0 .5 1 
BWA SSA 1 .04 0 . 1 1  0 .92 
MUS SSA 0.93 0.23 0 .7 1 
MYS Asia 0.86 -0.49 1 .3 5  
IND Asia 0.83 0 .33 0 .5  
EGY MENA 0 .57 0.07 0.5 
IDN Asia 0.39 0.29 0. 1 
CHL Latin America 0.34 0.09 0.25 
GHA SSA 0.33 0.09 0.25 
TZA SSA 0.05 0. 1 -0.04 
ZMB SSA 0.04 -0.08 0 . 1 2  
COL Latin America O.Q l 0 .02 -0. 0 1  
MWI SSA 0 0.09 -0.09 
ARG Latin America -0.0 1 -0. 1 4  0 . 1 3  
PHL Asia -0.06 0 .06 -0 . 1 1  
NGA SSA -0.08 -2 .96 2 .87 
CRI Latin America -0.09 0.07 -0. 1 6  
ZAF SSA -0. 1 -0.04 -0.06 
BRA Latin America -0. 1 1  0.05 -0. 1 6  
KEN SSA -0. 1 2  0.2 -0.3 1 
MEX Latin America -0. 1 2  0.05 -0 . 1 7  
SEN SSA -0. 1 4  0 . 1 -0.24 
ETH SSA -0. 1 4  0 . 1 -0.24 
MOR MENA -0. 1 6  0 . 1 1  -0.27 
BOL Latin America -0.2 -0.03 -0. 1 7  
VEN Latin America -0.29 0.09 -0 .39 
PER Latin America -0.34 0.06 -0.4 
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Table 8 Second Period Growth Decomposition Without the Dynamic Term 
Country Region Total Structural Change Technological Progress 
CHN Asia 1 .43 0 .38  1 .05 
IND Asia 0.66 0 . 1 4  0 .53 
ETH SSA 0.5  0 .22 0.28 
NGA SSA 0.47 0.3 0 . 1 7  
PER Latin America 0.43 0. 1 0 .33 
THA Asia 0.32 0 .06 0.27 
TZA SSA 0.3 1 0.34 -0.03 
BWA SSA 0.29 -0.2 0.49 
GHA SSA 0.27 0.04 0.23 
MUS SSA 0.27 0 .04 0 .24 
IDN Asia 0.27 0.03 0 .24 
EGY MENA 0.26 -0. 1 7  0.43 
MWI SSA 0.24 0.3 1 -0.07 
PHL Asia 0.24 0 .03 0.2 1 
ZAF SSA 0.24 -0.02 0.25 
ARG Latin America 0.22 -0.003 0.22 
CHL Latin America 0.22 -0. l 0.3 1 
MOR MENA 0.2 1 0.05 0 . 1 6  
COL Latin America 0.2 1 - 1 4 .89 1 5 . 1 1  
MYS Asia 0.2 0.03 0. 1 7  
SEN SSA 0. 1 0.05 0.05 
KEN SSA 0.09 -0.004 0.095 
BRA Latin America 0.08 0.03 0.05 
MEX Latin America -0.0 1 0 .004 -0.0 1 3  
ZMB SSA -0.04 -0.53 0 .5 
VEN Latin America -0.05 -0.04 -0.0 1 
CRI Latin America -0. 1 5  -0.09 -0.06 
BOL Latin America -0.22 -0.2 1 -0.0 1 
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Table 9 Robustness Check: First Period Decomposition 
Country Total Tech. Progress Structural Change Dynamic 
CHN 2 .70 2 .33 0 .24 0. 1 3  
THA 1 .09 0 .5 1 0.47 0 . 1 1  
BWA 1 .04 0 .92 0.90 -0.79 
MUS 0.93 0 .7 1 0 .34 -0. 1 2  
MYS 0.86 1 .35  -0.08 -0.4 1 
IND 0.83 0 .50 0.45 -0. 1 3  
EGY 0.57 0 .50 0.06 0.0 1 
IDN 0.39 0. 1 0  0 .36 -0.07 
CHL 0.34 0.25 0 .36 -0.27 
GHA 0.33 0 .25 0 . 1 3  -0.05 
TZA 0.05 -0.04 0. 1 7  -0.07 
ZMB 0.04 0 . 1 2  -0.09 0.00 
COL 0 .0 1  -0.0 1 0.07 -0.05 
MWI 0.00 -0.09 0.55 -0.46 
ARG -0.0 1 0 . 1 3  -0.03 -0 . 1 1  
PHL -0.06 -0 . 1 1  0 . 1 1  -0 .05 
NGA -0.08 2 .87  -0.53 -2.43 
CRI -0.09 -0. 1 6  0.20 -0. 1 3  
ZAF -0. 1 0  -0.06 0. 1 1  -0. 1 5  
BRA -0 . 1 1  -0. 1 6  0.20 -0. 1 5  
KEN -0. 1 2  -0.3 1 0.6 1 -0.42 
MEX -0. 1 2  -0. 1 7  0 .30 -0.25 
ETH -0. 1 4  -0.24 0. 1 3  -0.02 
SEN -0. 1 4  -0.24 0 .27 -0. 1 7  
MOR -0. 1 6  -0.06 -0.09 -0.0 1 
BOL -0.20 -0. 1 7  0 .32 -0 .35  
VEN -0.29 -0 .39 0 .40 -0.3 1 
PER -0.34 -0.40 0.26 -0.20 
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Table I 3 Summary Statistics: Section II 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. 
Structural Change (%) 1 40 0 .003 0. 1 2  
Structural Change (Log) 1 40 9 .62 0 .68 
Rigidity 1 40 1 .56 0.4 1 
Rigidity (t- 1 )  1 3 9  1 .57  0 .4 1  
Rigidity (t-2) 1 3 8  1 . 55  0.42 
Share of Agric in Employment 1 40 0.45 0.23 
Investment 1 3 1  2 1 .57  7.90 
Trade 1 3 1  5 8 . 1 8  33 .34 
Import 1 3 0  29.70 1 6 .69 
Export 1 3 0  28 .40 1 7.48 
Human Capital 1 3 3  47.28 23 .32 
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Table 18: Joint Significance Test for Labor Market Rigidity Coefficients 
Figure 8 Changes in Agricultural Share in Employment 
Model 1 2 Model 3 
Structural 
LM Rigidity 0.039 0 .048 0 .05 1 
(0.029) (0.032) 
LM Rigidity1-1 -0.0 1 3  -0.03 1 
LM Rigidity1-2 0.022 
Constant -0 .057 -0.05 1 -0.06 1 
(9_:Q_52) 
0 . 1 760 0 .363 1 0 .3 802 
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